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Abstract—This paper presents a semi-supervised approach
for intrusion detection. The method extends the unsupervised
Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring approach based
on Principal Component Analysis by introducing a supervised
optimization technique to learn the optimum scaling in the input
data. It inherits the advantages of the unsupervised strategy,
capable of uncovering new threats, with that of supervised
strategies, able of learning the pattern of a targeted threat. The
supervised learning is based on an extension of the gradient
descent method based on Partial Least Squares (PLS). Moreover,
we enhance this method by using sparse PLS variants. The
practical application of the system is demonstrated on a recently
published real case study, showing relevant improvements in
detection performance and in the interpretation of the attacks.
Index Terms—Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring,
Anomaly Detection, Intrusion Detection, Semi-supervised learn-
ing, Partial Least Squares regression, Principal Components
Analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cibersecurity incidents are considered one of the most
relevant threats for businesses in almost any market. According
to the VERIZON annual Data Breach Investigation Report
(DBIR) [1], tens of thousands of attacks targeted private and
public companies during 2017. To effectively fight against
this real menace, the security industry has identified that
an essential line of defense should be based on the joint
effort of all stakeholders combining their technical skills and
information [2]. In this regard, the use of anomaly-based
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) [3] is fundamental to unveil
previously unknown attack strategies and thwart potential
attacks to organizations.
Main technical challenges in the field of IDS design are
the need for handling massive and disparate sources of infor-
mation, the extraction of useful knowledge for the forensic
analysis of incident data and the optimization of the detection
system to targeted threats. Dealing with very different sources
of information and a vast amount of data has fostered the use
of machine learning and data mining techniques [4]. However,
it becomes essential to utilize tools and approaches that
provide interpretability of results, that is, information about the
features and the real cause of an attack in order to efficiently
respond to it. Regretfully, the bulk of machine learning and
data mining approaches does not satisfy this requirement.
J. Camacho, G. Macia´-Ferna´ndez and N. M. Fuentes-Garcı´a are with the
Department of Signal Theory, Telematics and Communications, School of
Computer Science and Telecommunications - CITIC University of Granada,
Granada, Spain.
E. Saccenti is with the Laboratory of Systems and Synthetic Biology,
Wageningen University & Research, Wageningen, the Netherlands.
Manuscript received June 18, 2018; revised XX, 2018.
Regarding the optimization to targeted threats, proper system
update is a relevant feature, in particular to make the most
of information sharing technologies that distribute warnings
among corporations when new threats arise. The adaptation
to targeted threats of machine learning models is more tech-
nically challenging than that of traditional rule-based systems
(e.g. antivirus, rule-based IDS like snort, correlation engines,
etc.), more extended in the industry.
Multivariate Analysis has been recognized as an outstanding
approach for anomaly detection in several domains, including
industrial monitoring [5] and networking [6]. In the field of
industrial processing, a well developed strategy is Multivariate
Statistical Process Control (MSPC). A main tool within MSPC
is Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which was proposed
by Lakhina et al. for intrusion detection in [7]. Some of the
benefits of PCA are its unsupervised nature, that does not
require any a-priori knowledge on the data, and its capability
to provide diagnosis information for a given anomaly, a main
advantage over other machine learning methodologies. This
diagnosis support allows shortening the lag from detection
to response in a security incident, and therefore has practical
implications.
In previous work [8], we introduced a methodology named
Multivariate Statistical Network Monitoring (MSNM), an ex-
tension of PCA-MSPC applied to the intrusion detection
problem. MSNM overcomes some reported limitations of the
original PCA approach of Lakhina et al. [9]. It is based
on an over-parameterization of the feature space, that is, on
defining a large number of data features within the detection
system. This combines with the multivariate approach based
on PCA, that can handle high-dimensional data with millions
of variables. However, an open problem and main limitation in
MSNM is how to select the relative relevance of the features
in the system. Experiments in [8] showed high sensitivity
of the detection to the relative relevance (scaling) of the
features in PCA. We can make the most of this sensitivity
to enhance the detection ability to a set of targeted threats.
In particular, defining an optimum scaling of the features to
identify the pattern of a recently identified threat is useful to
update the monitoring system. This would enhance MSNM
with an adaptation mechanism equivalent to what it is done
in a traditional rule-based detection system when adding rules
with the fingerprint of recently identified threats.
This paper presents a new procedure to optimize the scaling
of the features in MSNM for the detection of targeted threats.
This makes MSNM a semi-supervised learning approach,
where the original unsupervised PCA model is enhanced to
be optimum for the detection of specific anomalies. For this
purpose, we employ and improve an optimization algorithm
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[10][11] originally introduced in the context of process op-
timization. This algorithm is based on Partial Least Squares
(PLS) [12][13], a multivariate regression technique. We refer
to this algorithm as run-to-run PLS (R2R-PLS). The R2R-PLS
has been shown to outperform state-of-the-art optimization
techniques, like genetic algorithms, in large search spaces [10].
The contributions of this paper are the following:
• We cast the problem of adapting an anomaly detection
system to targeted threats into an optimization problem.
In particular, we apply an optimization scheme in the
context of anomaly detection with MSNM, overcoming
one of its principal limitations: the sensitivity of detection
to the features scaling. While this is specially interesting
in the context of intrusion detection, this contribution also
applies to different application domains [5].
• For this purpose, we extend the original R2R-PLS in
[10], [11] to a general optimization problem, simplify-
ing its implementation and improving its computational
efficiency.
• We further extend the R2R-PLS optimization to sparse
PLS variants, very popular in biological sciences [14],
leading to an improvement of the optimization perfor-
mance and in the understanding of the connection be-
tween the features scale and the MSNM detection.
• We demonstrate previous contributions in a recently pub-
lished real case study [15].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses related work to this paper. Section 3 introduces the
MSNM technique. Section 4 reviews PLS and two sparse
variants. Section 5 presents our particular implementation of
the R2R-PLS algorithm. Its application in the adaptation of
MSNM to new threats is presented in Section 6. Section 7
demonstrates the application of the approach to the real case
study. Section 8 draws some concluding remarks.
II. RELATED WORK
Machine learning (ML) techniques have been widely ap-
plied to cybersecurity problems. ML refers to the combination
of statistics and artificial intelligence to learn a model from
data [4][16][17]. This is a global term widely used to refer to
the task in which one automatically calibrates (trains) a model
or algorithm to obtain a descriptive output for a given input.
If the value for the output is previously known and used in the
training, then the learning is called supervised and it usually
applies to classification and regression problems. However, if
only the input data are known and the objective is to extract
patterns or common behaviour from the data, the learning
is known as unsupervised [16][18]. Mixed approaches are
considered to be semi-supervised learning [18]. Support vector
machines, neural networks or decision trees are common
examples of supervised learning, thought extensions exist in
the unsupervised setting. Factorization methods like PCA and
clustering algorithms such as K-means are often applied for
unsupervised analyses and often combined with supervised
methods.
In cybersecurity, unsupervised ML methods are applied
to the anomaly detection problem, a.k.a. intrusion detection
problem, while supervised methods can be used to detect and
classify previously observed attacks. In this context, the use
of PCA was proposed more than a decade ago [19]. Due to
its unsupervised nature, PCA does not require –and is not
limited by– an a-priori specification of potential anomalies
in the system. This means that PCA is still useful to detect
new types of anomalies, something mandatory in real world
anomaly detection. The most referred work for PCA anomaly
detection is that of Lakhina et al. [7], form which alternative
proposals have been developed [20][21][22][23]. One of them,
the MSNM methodology [8], is the base of the approach of
this paper. This methodology allows to combine traffic data
with other security data sources, demonstrating high detection
capabilities and with the advantage of providing diagnosis
support [24].
The learning process in ML yields a model from a training
data set. This learning process is also referred to as model cali-
bration, and it is generally performed by optimizing the model
parameters in consecutive steps until convergence [4][17].
The calibration of the parameters is performed following
optimization strategies, which pursue to find, at least, local
optimums for their values and, hopefully, global solutions
[25]. These approaches can be classified as follows [16]:
Stochastic approximation methods, expectation-maximization
methods and greedy optimization. Within stochastic optimiza-
tion, gradient descent methods apply the derivative of the
optimization function to obtain the direction of search. In
recent papers [10][11] a variation of this type of optimization
based on Partial Least Squares (PLS) was presented. PLS
is a particular form of regression model suitable to handle
high dimensional data sets. For this reason, the PLS-based
optimization is specially suited to solve optimization problems
where the search space is of high dimensionality. Therefore,
it is a practical choice in ML to optimize a large number of
model parameters.
While PLS is well suited to model high dimensional data,
a recent trend of research has explored the ability of a
type of methods that perform PLS regression combined with
variable selection. These are generally referred to as sparse
PLS (SPLS) methods. Several variants of SPLS been proposed
[14][26][27][28][29] with the goal of performing variable
selection during model calibration, discarding non-informative
variables. Results show that SPLS variants are more stable and
often yield improved performance in very high dimensional
set-ups.
This paper presents a semi-supervised approach for intru-
sion detection. The method extends the unsupervised MSNM
approach by introducing a supervised optimization technique
to learn the optimum scaling of the features. It inherits the
advantages of the unsupervised strategy, capable of uncovering
new threats, with that of supervised strategies, capable of
learning the pattern of a given threat. Considering that the
number of features of MSNM corresponds to the dimension
of the search space in the optimization problem, and that
this number can be very large, we apply the PLS-based
optimization for the supervised learning. Furthermore, we
extend this optimization technique using sparse variants of
PLS, improving the learning ability and model interpretability.
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III. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL NETWORK MONITORING
The MSNM follows 4 main steps: 1) Parsing, 2) Fusion,
3) Detection, and 4) Diagnosis. The first three steps are
equivalent to what it is commonly done in other machine
learning methodologies. However, step 4 is a main advantage
in MSNM. This step is possible thanks to the white-box,
exploratory characteristics of PCA as the core of the approach.
PCA is a linear model and as such it is easy to interpret
in terms of the connection between anomalies and features,
something much more complicated in the non-linear machine
learning variants.
A. Parsing
The information captured from a network is usually pre-
sented in the form of system logs or network traces, and cannot
be directly used to feed a typical tool for anomaly detection.
Therefore, some sort of parsing and feature engineering needs
to be done in order to generate quantitative features that can
be used for data modeling.
Lakhina et al. [7] proposed the definition of counters
obtained from Netflow records as quantitative features for
anomaly detection using PCA. In [30], we generalized this
definition to consider several sources of data, proposing the
feature-as-a-counter approach. Each feature contains the num-
ber of times a given event (e.g. number of packets sent from
public IPs or number of flows associated to destination port
80) takes place during a given time window. The parsing
transforms the raw data in a stream of features, where each
time interval of e.g. 1 minute is represented by a feature vector
of counts.
B. Fusion
The feature-as-a-counter definition simplifies the fusion of
different data sources in a single set of features. For each
different source of data, a set of features (counters) is defined.
The sampling rate for each source may be different, due to the
specific dynamics of the source. Thus, to combine the features
from different sources these need to be stretched/compressed
to a common sampling rate, yielding a unique matrix of data
of high dimensionality. In practice, when possible, all sources
are parsed at the same time rate, so that the fusion operation
is done by simply appending the features associated to the
different sources.
The combination of the feature-as-a-counter and the fusion
procedure is specially suited for the subsequent multivariate
analysis. It yields high dimensional feature vectors that need to
be analyzed with dimension reduction techniques, like PCA.
The diagnosis procedure benefits from the definition of a large
number of features for a better description of the anomaly
taking place. Furthermore, counters and their correlation are
easy to interpret.
C. Detection
The core of MSNM is PCA. PCA is applied to data sets
where M variables or features are measured on N observations
with the aim of finding the subspace of maximum variance
in the M -dimensional feature space. The original features
are linearly transformed into the Principal Components (PCs),
which are the eigenvectors of XX := XT · X, typically for
mean centred (MC) X and sometimes also after auto-scaling
(AS, normalization to unit variance).
The PCA model follows the expression:
X = TA ·PtA +EA, (1)
where A is the number of PCs, TA is the N×A score matrix,
PA is the M×A loading matrix and EA is the N×M matrix
of residuals.
For each observation, corresponding to a feature vector
collected in a given time interval, the corresponding score
vector is computed as follows:
tn = xn ·PA (2)
where xn is a 1×M vector representing the observation and
tn a 1×A vector with the corresponding scores, while
en = xn − tn ·PtA (3)
corresponds to the residuals.
For the detection of anomalies in MSNM, a pair of charts
are monitored: the Q-statistic (Q-st), which compresses the
residuals; and the D-statistic (D-st) or Hotelling’s T2 statistic,
computed from the scores. The D-st and the Q-st for an
observation can be computed from the following equations:
Dn = tn · (ΣT )−1 · ttn (4)
Qn = en · etn (5)
where ΣT represents the covariance matrix of the scores in
the calibration data.
With the statistics computed from the calibration data,
upper control limits (UCL), i.e. detection thresholds, can be
established in the charts at a certain confidence level [31]
to decide if future events are anomalous. A straightforward
approach to define the UCLs is by using percentiles over the
statistics computed from the calibration data X. Once the
system is calibrated and control limits computed, it can be
applied to incoming data/traffic. An anomaly is identified when
either the D-st or the Q-st exceeds the pre-defined UCLs.
D. Diagnosis
Once an anomaly is detected, a diagnosis step is performed
to identify the features associated with it. This information
is very useful to identify and, eventually, troubleshoot the
possible root causes of the anomaly. The contribution of the
features to a given anomaly can be investigated with the
contribution plots or similar tools, like oMEDA [32]. Thus,
anomalies are detected in the D-st and/or Q-st statistics, and
then the diagnosis is performed with e.g. oMEDA. The output
of oMEDA is a 1 ×M vector where each element contains
the contribution of the corresponding feature to the anomaly
under study. Those contributions with large magnitude, either
positive or negative, are considered to be relevant.
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While the diagnosis capabilities of MSNM are a main
advantage over other ML techniques, these capabilities are not
the focus of this paper. The interested reader is referred to [24].
IV. PARTIAL LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION AND SPARSE
VARIANTS
This section introduces the regression techniques that we
will employ within the optimization of the scaling parameters
of MSNM. The regression models are used to estimate the
gradient in the optimization. Since the scaling parameters, and
so the gradient, are high dimensional, we need regression tech-
niques that are suitable for the analysis of high dimensional
data sets. This is the case of PLS and sparse variants.
A. Partial Least Squares
PLS is a particular form of regression that is suitable
in presence of collinearity in the predictors, common in
high dimensional problems. Collinearity makes the classical
multivariate least-squares (LS) regression break down due
to singularity of the covariance matrix. PLS extends LS by
inheriting the philosophy of PCA.
Briefly, given a N × O response matrix Y and a N ×M
set X of predictors variables, the PLS algorithm defines a
subspace of X which maximizes its covariance with Y. The
PLS model can written as:
X = T ·PT +E (6)
Y = T ·QT + F (7)
where T is the N×A score matrix, A the number of latent
variables (LVs) to be used to fit the model, P and Q are the
M×A and O×A loading matrices for the predictors and the
response, respectively, and E and F are the N×M and N×O
residual matrices of X and Y. Setting
BˆPLS = W · (PT ·W)−1 ·QT (8)
with W the M×A matrix of weights, the two models given by
Equations (6) and (7) can be re-arranged in a single regression
model given by
Y = X · BˆPLS + F (9)
The PLS model can be obtained, among others, using the
NIPALS algorithm, and the optimal number of LVs A can
be estimated by cross-validation.
B. Sparse PLS
Although PLS can effectively handle noisy predictor vari-
ables, the inclusion of variables which are non-relevant for
the prediction of the response usually decreases the prediction
performance of the model. Several variants of the PLS algo-
rithm have been proposed [14][26][27][28][29] with the goal
of performing variable selection during model calibration. This
family of algorithms is termed Sparse PLS (SPLS), and are
often reported to show improved performance over PLS in
high dimensional data. The most extended approach to define
sparse models is based on the LASSO regularization [33],
often applied using a soft-thresholding operation [34].
One popular SPLS algorithm is the variant proposed by Leˆ
Cao et al. [35] where the (sparse) PLS problem is solved using
singular value decomposition [36]. Briefly, given the response
(Y) and predictor (X) matrices, the R-rank matrix
C = XTY (10)
can be decomposed as
C = GDUT (11)
where the matrices G (N×R) and U (L×R) are orthonormal
and D is R × R diagonal containing the singular values of
C. Using this formulation, the loading vectors pr and qr for
X and Y are the singular vectors gr and ur of G and U,
respectively.
A sparse PLS solution can be obtained by penalizing (i.e.
forcing to 0) the loadings [37], which are a measure of the
relative importance of each variable to the PLS model, by
solving the optimization problem:
arg min
p,q
‖C− pqT‖2F + λ1‖p‖1 + λ2‖q‖1 (12)
whose solution is given by the soft-thresholding gλ(x) =
sign(x) (|x| − λ)+ applied to the standard PLS solution. The
two parameters λ1 and λ2 control the sparsity for X and
Y, respectively. However, a more practical and equivalent
alternative is to select the number of non zero components
of the loadings Nx and Ny [35] in the soft-thresholding [34].
In the context of this paper we restrict ourselves to set Nx, so
that only loadings in the x-block are sparse, since the response
is univariate. Optimum values of this parameter can be found
by cross-validation.
C. Group-wise PLS
A different approach to obtain sparse PLS solutions is the
recently proposed Group-wise PLS (GPLS) [38], where the
solution is found by defining groups of correlated predictor
variables rather than using regularization.
Briefly, the GPLS algorithm starts by defining a set of K
(possibly overlapping) groups of correlated variables that are
obtained from a M ×M correlation map M computed from
C = XTY. Subsequently, the weights and scores of K PLS
models of 1 LV, each of them considering only the set of
variables corresponding to one of the groups, are computed.
From these, the one with the largest correlation with Y is
retained while the others are discarded. This is repeated for a
number of LVs.
The GPLS approach is particularly suited for data explo-
ration, but when data is sparse in a group-wise fashion (i.e.
when there are groups of correlated variables related to the
response) the algorithm outperforms PLS and SPLS in terms
of goodness of prediction.
The fitting of a GPLS model requires the definition of
a threshold, γ, to identify the groups of variables in M,
controlling simultaneously the number and size of the groups
of variables to be used. Optimal values for γ can be chosen by
graphically inspecting the correlation map M, by controlling
TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, MAY 2017 5
the trade-off between group size and dimension or by using
cross-validation.
V. RUN-TO-RUN XPLS OPTIMIZATION
The optimization of the scaling parameters of MSNM is
defined as a gradient descent algorithm, where the gradient
is estimated with the PLS-based methods discussed in the
previous section. This optimization approach has been shown
to outperform state-of-the-art optimization techniques, in par-
ticular genetic algorithms, in high dimensional search spaces
[10].
Let us define u as a set of inputs we can vary as desired,
typically within some specific bounds or constraints, to a
system we would like to optimize. Let us also define y as
the set of outputs we would like to optimize (either maximize
or minimize) by setting appropriate values to u. The goal of
the optimization algorithm is to find those values in the input
that optimize the output, see Fig.1. Without loss of generality,
in the following we will assume we desire to maximize the
values in y by properly setting u, which is contrary to common
optimization literature but more appropriate for our specific
case.
The run to run (R2R) optimization algorithm [10], extended
for a general optimization problem and for PLS, SPLS and
GPLS, can be summarized as follows:
0. Select user defined parameters K (number of individual
solutions in each iteration) and rc (level of exploration).
Initialize input solution candidate ui for i = 0.
1. Repeat for k = {1...K}
1.1. Generate random variant solution u˜ki = ui + rc · rki ,
for rki drawn from a multinormal random distribu-
tion.
1.2. Apply input u˜ki to the system in Fig.1 and measure
output y˜ki .
2. Fit a xPLS model with the K instances of the inputs u˜ki
arranged in the rows of U˜i, and outputs y˜ki arranged in
rows of Y˜i:
Y˜i = U˜i · Bˆi + F (13)
3. Compute the next input solution candidatea as: ui+1 =
ui + 3 · Bˆi
4. Check for convergence in the solution and otherwise loop
back to Step 1.
In each iteration, the xPLS model captures the variability
around ui related to the response. This allows the estimation
of the gradient in the optimization. A random signal is added
to the input to ensure that there is enough trade-off between
exploration and exploitation.
We have intentionally overlooked the problem of meta-
parameter estimation within the optimization. As already dis-
cussed, we need to define the number of LVs in PLS and
there is one additional meta-parameter in each of the two
sparse variants. Unfortunately, the use of cross-validation or
other automatic means for meta-parameter selection is compu-
tational intensive, but this problem can be overcome. Within a
aFor minimization, the second addend is subtracted to the current solution.
gradient based optimization, we can simplify meta-parameter
selection for the sake of computational efficiency. This is
done by fixing meta-parameters during the optimization. To
minimize a detrimental effect on performance, we set PLS,
SPLS or GPLS to be very parsimonious, with the intuition
that if the model was parsimonious in excess, this would be
overcome by performing more iterations in the optimization.
First, we suggest to use one single LV in step 2., since any
further contribution of additional LVs can be done in future
iterations. Regarding parameters Nx in SPLS and γ in GPLS,
we suggest to set them so that models are very sparse, since
again any missing variability in one iteration can be taken into
account in future iterations.
System
R2R
U Y
Fig. 1: Optimization scheme.
VI. SEMI-SUPERVISED MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL
NETWORK MONITORING
This section particularizes the R2R optimization algorithm
to our specific application: the optimization of the scaling
parameters in MSNM. Here, the input u we would like to set
is the scaling of the features in MSNM so as to maximize its
detection performance, which is the output y. In the following
we discuss in detail inputs and outputs and the complete
system.
A. Output of the optimizer
There are several possibilities to measure the detection
performance of an anomaly detection system like MSNM.
Here we will use the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUROC or
AUC) computed from a labelled data set, where observations
are labelled as normal or attacks. The receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve shows the evolution of the true
positive rate (TPR) versus the false positive rate (FPR) for
different values of the classifying threshold, discussed below.
The TPR is the percentage of true attacks that are identified
by the MSNM system, while the FPR is the percentage of
normal observations identified as attacks. The AUC is a scalar
that quantifies the quality of the anomaly detector. An anomaly
detector should present an AUC as close to 1 as possible, while
an AUC around 0.5 corresponds to a random classifier.
The ROC curves for MSNM are obtained by varying a
threshold in a specific combination of the Q-st and the D-st:
MSNMn =
A ·Dn
M · UCLD +
(M −A) ·Qn
M · UCLQ (14)
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where MSNMn is the output of the anomaly detector at a
given observation n, Dn and Qn the corresponding statistics
and UCLD and UCLQ the corresponding 99% Upper Control
Limits (UCL), computed as percentiles in the calibration data.
Recall that A is the number of components in PCA and M
the number of features in the data.
B. Input of the optimizer
To optimize the AUC, we modify the values of the scaling
of the features. These features were computed in the parsing
step of MSNM. The scale of the features changes their relative
importance in the PCA model. Since PCA maximizes variance,
the higher the relative scale (weight) of a variable, the more
percentage of its information is captured in the scores and the
less in the residuals of the model in Equation (1). However,
understanding how this scaling impacts the detection ability
of a MSNM system for a given attack is a real challenge, due
to the non-linear nature of the detection statistics.
Given a vector xm of size N×1, corresponding to a column
of X with the values of one given feature (counter) in the N
calibration observations, which we assume to be mean centred,
its scaled version is given by
x˜i = xiwi (15)
Here we propose to define a set of values of w1, w2, . . . , wM
to be chosen such that when applied to the calibration data X,
detection by MSNM will be optimal in terms of AUC for one
type or a set of types of attacks identified in a labelled data
set.
C. Optimization procedure
The complete semisupervised system is depicted in Fig. 2.
A detailed description of the optimization procedure follows:
1) Row vector w0, 1 × M , is initialized such as w0 =
(1, 1, . . . , 1)M . The number of individual solutions in
each iteration, K>> 1, and the level of exploration rc
are chosen.
2) Row vector w10, 1 × M , is generated such as w10 =
w0 + rc · r10 where r10 is a 1×M random vector whose
entries are ≈ N(0, 1).
3) The weighting vector w10 is applied to the calibration
data X and the detection performance of the resulting
MSNM system AUC10 is recorded.
4) Step 1 and 2 are repeated K times: resulting vectors
w10,w
2
0, . . . ,w
K
0 are arranged in a K×M matrix S0 and
the corresponding system performances in a K×1 vector
y0 = (AUC
1
0 , AUC
1
0 , . . . AUC
K
0 )
t. The k-th row of S
contains the k-th vector of weights wk0 and yk = AUC
k
0 .
5) A xPLS model is fitted regressing y0 on S0 obtaining a
set of regression coefficient Bˆ0.
6) The current solution is updated: w1 = w0 + 3 · Bˆ0.
7) We check for convergence in w, and otherwise loop to
step 2.
MSNM
PCA
ROC
R2R
GPLSSPLSPLS
AUC𝝎
Calibration 
Data 
(unsupervised)
Test
Data 
(supervised)
Fig. 2: Semi-supervised MSNM Optimization scheme.
TABLE I: Features of the calibration and the test sets in the
UGR’16 dataset.
Feature Calibration Test
Capture start 10:47h 03/18/2016 13:38h 07/27/2016
Capture end 18:27h 06/26/2016 09:27h 08/29/2016
Attacks start N/A 00:00h 07/28/2016
Attacks end N/A 12:00h 08/09/2016
Number of files 17 6
Size (compressed) 181GB 55GB
# Connections ≈ 13,000M ≈ 3,900M
VII. CASE STUDY: UGR’16 DATA SET
A. Experimental Framework
We evaluate our approach to optimize variables scaling in a
real scenario. The dataset considered is the publicly available
UGR’16 dataset [15]. These data consist of Netflow network
traces taken from a real Tier 3 ISP network composed of
virtualized and hosted services of many companies and clients.
Netflow sensors were located in the border routers of the
network, capturing all the incoming and outgoing traffic from
the ISP. All the details related to the dataset are summarized
in Table I and can be consulted in [15]. Two blocks of data
are provided, one for training models (calibration set), and the
other for testing the results obtained from those models (test
set).
The UGR’16 dataset is especially interesting for our exper-
iments because the collected traffic includes controlled attack
traffic against fake victims generated by 25 virtual machines
that were deployed within the network. Thus, our aim is to test
if our optimization algorithm is able to capture the relevant
variables for every attack type and properly scale them to
achieve good detection results. Although the variety of attacks
in this dataset is limited, this is the only recent dataset (see
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TABLE II: Variable values considered as features in our
detection system.
Variable #features → values
Source IP 2 → public, private
Destination IP 2 → public, private
Source port 50 → specific services, Other
Destination port 50 → specific services, Other
Protocol 5 → TCP, UDP, ICMP, IGMP, Other
Flags 6 → A, S, F, R, P, U
ToS 3 → 0, 192, Other
# Packets in 5 → very low, low, medium, high, very high
# Packets out 5 → very low, low, medium, high, very high
# Bytes in 5 → very low, low, medium, high, very high
# Bytes out 5 → very low, low, medium, high, very high
survey of datasets in [15]) that includes real background traffic
for a considerable amount of time (4 months), which is an
essential requisite to properly evaluate the false positive rate
in our detection results.
The attack traffic was performed during the test set collec-
tion, in particular during its first 12,000 observations, and it
presents these different patterns:
• Low-rate DoS (dos): TCP SYN attack during 3 minutes
by using the tool hping3. There are three different vari-
ants, where one-to-one or many-to-one are combined with
different schedulings.
• Port scanning (scan11): Continuous one-to-one scanning
from an attacker to a single victim’s IP during 3 minutes
by using the nmap tool.
• Port scanning (scan44): Continuous scanning from 4
different attacker machines to four victim’s IP in parallel
during 3 minutes by using the nmap tool.
• Botnet traffic (nerisbotnet): The test set includes botnet
traffic traces obtained from the execution of the malware
known as Neris, corresponding to the capture CTU-
Malware-Capture-Botnet-42 available in [39]. In this
malware version, infected bots send SPAM, connect to
an HTTP C&C server and use HTTP to perform some
ClickFraud.
For the processing of the dataset, we consider time intervals
of one minute. All the flows during an interval are aggregated
and summarized into a M -dimensional vector, which corre-
sponds to an observation. In particular, we define a set of
M=138 network-related features, corresponding to 11 different
Netflow variables, as shown in Table II.
Calibration data was cleaned of outliers following the Phase
1 approach in [8], so we expect it to be mainly composed of
normal observations. A main real threat identified and cleaned
from the calibration and test data is a SPAM campaign driven
from some of the virtual machines located in the ISP. The
cleaned calibration set is used to calibrate the MSNM system.
The first 12,000 observations in the cleaned test data were split
in two independent parts with 6,000 observations. The first set
is used within the optimization to select the optimum scaling.
The second set is used to validate the results. We also used
the unclean second test data set, including the SPAM traffic, to
assess the performance of the methods with previously unseen
attacks.
B. Results
To assess the performance of the semi-supervised MSNM
approach, we compare it with the unsupervised MSNM and
the Support Vector Machine (SVM) technique, bluethe latter
being a representative of a supervised approach. Two variants
of the unsupervised MSNM for two preprocessing schemes,
Mean-Centering (MSNM-MC) and Auto-Scaling (MSNM-AS),
are considered. Two variants of the SVM are also considered,
one based on the linear kernel (SVM-L) and one on the radial
basis function kernel (SVM-RBF). To calibrate the anomaly de-
tector, unsupervised techniques only make use of the (cleaned)
calibration data, described in the previous section. Supervised
techniques employ only the (cleaned) first test data set, which
includes both normal traffic and all the types of artificial
attacks. SVM metaparameters are selected according to recom-
mendations in the Matlab documentation of function ’fitcsvm’.
The semi-supervised MSNM is initially set to the MSNM-MC,
and then optimized with the R2R algorithm using the (cleaned)
first test data set. In all optimization runs, K is set to 100
and rc is set to 0.01. Methods are compared in terms of the
AUC computed for the (cleaned) second test set, and thus from
independent data to that used in the calibration of the anomaly
detectors. We derive confidence intervals in the performance
using resampling techniques without replacement.
Fig. 3 shows the AUCs of the different detection approaches
for the four artificial attack patterns. For the calibration, no
distinction is made on the type of attack, that is, the anomaly
detectors are calibrated using two types of labels: normal and
attack. For the evaluation, each group of AUCs is computed
comparing normal data with the specific type of attack, leaving
out the observations corresponding to the other attack patterns.
We expect supervised approaches to outperform the others in
this experiment, since all the attacks under evaluation were
used in their calibration. As expected, unsupervised methods
generally yield the worst results, in particular the MSNM-MC
approach. The MSNM-AS is generally outperformed by semi-
supervised techniques. The improvement is more notable in
the case of the nerisbotnet pattern. It is remarkable that this
is generated by a botnet that is equipped with mechanisms to
hide its traffic and, thus, the detection of this traffic following
unsupervised methodologies is a real challenge. In general
we can conclude that the R2R optimization is improving the
performance of the MSNM, but this improvement is limited
when diverse attacks patterns are optimized at the same time,
since different patterns may counteract in the optimization.
Supervised approaches based on SVM yield very good results.
In particular, the SVM-RBF shows a similar performance
to semi-supervised MSNM, and the linear kernel is among
the best anomaly detectors for all the anomalies and clearly
outperforms the other methods in ’nerisbotnet’.
One typical advantage that is claimed for unsupervised (and
most semi-supervised) methods in comparison to supervised
approaches is that they are capable of identifying new threats.
This is because they are based on a model of normality, and
any new threat that does not follow that model can be detected.
To check whether the semi-supervised MSNM retains this
capability after the scaling optimization, we compared its
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Fig. 3: AUC values per artificial attack type. Supervised and
semi-supervised approaches calibrated without distinguishing
attack types. Quartiles (25% and 75%) and median are shown
in the bars.
performance with the other methods in the detection of the
real SPAM traffic in the (unclean) second test data set. The
anomaly detectors are the same as those used before, and
therefore they were calibrated using independent and cleaned
data, in absence of any SPAM trace. Therefore, supervised
techniques are not expected to outperform the others in this
experiment. Results are shown in Fig. 4. We can see that
the semi-supervised methods provide a good performance in
comparison to the rest, and even outperform the unsupervised
MSNM. This cannot be understood as a general result. In
principle, all MSNM variants have the same apriori probability
to detect new threats, since this depends very much on the
relationship between the new threat and the normality model.
As the new threat can be anything, this relationship will likely
vary from case to case. However, this experiment shows that
the optimization did not have a negative effect on the ability
of MSNM to detect the unseen threat. Regarding supervised
approaches, the SVM-L yielded a very poor result on the new
attack type, as expected for a supervised technique, but the
SVM-RBF showed the best result among the methods. blueThis
result can be explained due to the special properties of SVM-
RBF. This method is supervised since during calibration,
the classifier is optimized to distinguish between the two
classes of data. However, the model identifies a support that
contains one of the classes, and the rest of the feature space
is assigned to the other class. If the former is the class
for normal observations, and the latter models the attacks,
the configuration of SVM-RBF mimics that in MSNM, or in
general of an anomaly detector, and is indeed very useful to
detect new anomalies. Note, however, that if the labels for
normal and anomalous classes are switched, the SVM-RBF
provides the worst performance, and that, according to our
previous discussion, this specific result is very dependent on
the relationship between the new threat and the normality
model.
Another experiment we can conduct is to calibrate the semi-
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Fig. 4: AUC values for the real SPAM traffic. Quartiles (25%
and 75%) and median are shown in the bars.
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Fig. 5: AUC values per artificial attack type. Supervised
and semi-supervised approaches calibrated per attack type.
Quartiles (25% and 75%) and the median are shown in the
bars.
supervised and supervised methods specifically per attack
type. This approach can be used to calibrate ensembles of
detectors, which may be a suitable approach when the profiles
of different attacks vary to a large extent. Mimicking rule-
based detectors, where each rule corresponds to a single type
of attack, we can have an anomaly detector optimized for
each attack type. Performance results are shown in Fig. 5.
We can see that this approach is generally beneficial for semi-
supervised approaches, while in supervised methods it even
degrades the results. Among the semi-supervised methods,
sparse PLS methods tend to outperform standard PLS, in
particular for the ’nerisbotnet’ attack.
blueFrom the previous experiments, we can conclude that
the R2R optimization leads to a general improvement of the
MSNM performance, conforming a semi-supervised approach
that is competitive with state-of-the-art techniques and that
retains the capability to detect new threats. Note that the un-
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supervised MSNM was generally outperformed by supervised
techniques, but this comes at a price: supervised techniques are
not generally applicable to most real cases, where the labelling
of observations is not available. This is actually the common-
place in the cybersecurity industry [40]. Semi-supervised
techniques can still be used when none or a partial labelling is
available. Furthermore, the MSNM approach has the additional
advantage over state-of-the-art supervised techniques to be an
interpretable model, and thus easier to use and understand
by practitioners [8]. While above we only compared in terms
of detection, MSNM also provides diagnosis support, that is,
information about why an attack was identified as such. This is
actually a principal ability to reduce the time of response to an
attack or to quickly identify a false positive. Black-box models,
like the non-linear SVM, cannot be interpreted. Therefore,
they do not provide the information about why an attack was
identified. Finally, it should be noted that none of the SVMs
generally outperformed the semi-supervised methods in all the
detection experiments performed.
It turns out that the result of the R2R optimization can also
be interpreted. Fig. 6 compares the scaling profiles obtained
from the optimization with PLS, SPLS and GPLS, and with
and without distinguishing among the attack types. In general,
sparse methodologies provide clearer profiles, with lower
numbers of picks and easier to interpret. The picks reflect
those features that are relevant for the detection of the type
of attack. We can also see that the optimization using all
attack types (GloOpt) is dominated by the ’nerisbotnet’ attack
pattern, since in all cases the profile shows a large pick in the
same feature than the profile specifically optimized for that
attack. Again, this illustrates the limitation of using this semi-
supervised approach for a set of disparate attacks, rather than
on a per-attack basis.
To interpret the profiles in Fig. 6, we selected those peaks
exceeding the average scaling value plus one standard devia-
tion and listed them in Tables III, IV and V. Recall that these
variables will have a higher influence on the MSNM detector,
but the rest of variables will also impact the detection, to a
lesser extent.
In Table III (PLS) we see that the GloOpt selects three
features: the number of connections with source port 1080
(sport_socks), with source port between 49152 and
65535 (sport_private) and with destination port 6667
(dport_irc). The first feature is related to the SOCKS
proxy, an Internet proxy service. That port has been associated
in the past to several types of attacks, mainly trojans and
SPAM. The second feature is a very general one, and might
have been incorrectly selected due to the low signal-to-noise
ratio in R2R-PLS. The last feature is related to the nerisbotnet.
It is out of question that the IRC port is also related to
normal activity. However, in the traffic of the network we
are monitoring, the amount of IRC is low and the counter in
dport_irc can be a valid means to detect malicious activity.
Looking at the selection in Table IV, for SPLS, we can
see that the number of features selected is reduced and more
interpretable, but we still find some potentially inconsistent
results. For instance, in the list of the most relevant variables
for nerisbotnet, we can see that dport oracle is present, despite
TABLE III: Variables with highest weights from PLS opti-
mization.
GloOpt: sport socks, sport private
dport irc
SpecOpt dos: sport telnet, sport rapservice
dport http
SpecOpt scan11: sport syslog, sport reserved
dport kpasswd
tcpflags ACK
npackets medium
SpecOpt scan44: sport cups
dport telnet, dport kpasswd
SpecOpt nerisbotnet: dport irc
tcpflags PSH
npackets medium
the fact that this botnet does not generate any traffic towards
the oracle port. This potential inaccuracy is not affecting the
detection results of this attack, as shown in Fig. 5, which
are considerably improved in comparison to the other MSNM
variants. Using GPLS (Table V) the features are subsequently
reduced. While this is in general convenient, it does not ne-
cessarily imply a benefit in terms of performance. For instance,
the global optimizer is mainly focus on the nerisbotnet attack.
Differences between SPLS and GPLS may be associated to the
degree of sparseness of the models, which is governed by the
specific metaparameters used but also by the specificities of the
training data. In SPLS we usedNx = 2, the most parsimonious
value that results in multivariate regression vectors. In GPLS
we set γ = 0.8. The same metaparameters may result in
opposite sparseness levels for a different data set. However, we
can generally conclude that the use of sparse methods within
the R2R algorithm led to improvements in terms of AUC and
parsimony, and therefore of interpretability of results.
TABLE IV: Variables with highest weights from SPLS opti-
mization.
GloOpt: sport private
dport kpasswd, dport irc
SpecOpt dos: sport telnet
SpecOpt scan11: dport kpasswd
SpecOpt scan44: sport ldaps
dport telnet, dport kpasswd
SpecOpt nerisbotnet: dport oracle, dport irc
TABLE V: Variables with highest weights from GPLS opti-
mization.
GloOpt: dport irc
SpecOpt dos: sport telnet
SpecOpt scan11: dport kpasswd
SpecOpt scan44: dport telnet, dport kpasswd
SpecOpt nerisbotnet: dport irc
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide a solution to combine the ad-
vantages of unsupervised and supervised learning in the con-
text of intrusion detection. For this, we use the Multivariate
Statistical Network Monitoring approach, recently proposed,
and we enhance an optimization algorithm based on Partial
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Fig. 6: Optimized weights by PLS (a), SPLS (b) and GPLS (c). GlobOpt makes reference to the optimized profile obtained
with no distinction among attack types. SpecOpt makes reference to the optimized profile per attack type.
Least Squares, specially suited for multivariate optimization
problems. The result is an anomaly detection system that can
be optimized for the detection of a set of attack patterns.
Our approach provides a machine learning technique with
similar flexibility to update to new attack patterns as in a
rule based system. Combined with unsupervised methods,
we can still identify unseen (zero-day) patterns of malicious
activity. This paper also introduces for the first time the
application of sparse methodologies in intrusion detection,
which were seen to be very effective within the proposed semi-
supervised detection machine. Results with real traffic showed
the practical applicability of the approach.
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